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1.

Petr presents a

potent~ally

certworthy

~estio~~-

~

May statements that are held inadmissible at trial (because the
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right
to counsel and to remain silent after receiving Miranda warnings)
be used to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant?
final.

There also is a question whether the decision below is

(W~0 ~ vt-~~~
Di~c,ww . Set
bQrJ. .

- 2 -
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2.

FACTS:

Resp drove his car off the road at two o'clock

in the morning. and hit several posts.

The Chief of Police of

Ashfield, Mass. went to the scene of the accident and noticed
that resp appeared to be under the influence of either drugs
or alcohol, or both.

He read resp the Miranda warnings,

arrested him, and called the state police.

Trooper Taliaferro

of the state police arrived, and the three men went to State
Police Barracks.

There Trooper Taliaferro again read resp his
·L

rights and told him that his license would be suspended if he
refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.

Resp consented but

also tried, in vain, to contact a lawyer.

About 40 minutes later

the breathalyzer test was administered; the results of the
test created a statutory presumption that resp had been driving
~~

under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

After the test,

1

resp and discovered a marijuana cigarette in his shirt pocket.

The trooper advised resp that he also would be charged with
possession of marijuana and again read the Miranda warnings.
Resp replied that he saw nothing wrong in the possession of one

marijuana cigarette.

l

The trooper then asked him if he had any other

marijuana on his person or in the car, and resp said he had more
marijuana in his car.

He also stated that he could name some

"biggies", apparently referring to drug dealers whom he was willing

to identify in exchange for leniency, but Trooper Taliaferro told
him not to say anything further.
On the basis of resp's statements, the trooper prepared an
_,

affidavit in support of an application for a warrant to search resp's

. -
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(

car, which he obtained.

The search of the car's trunk turned up ~

a substantial quantity of marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, and
LSD, as well as $3,195 in cash stored in a strong box.

Resp

was tried for possession of the controlled substances with intent
to distribute.
Resp moved to suppress his statements and the evidence
seized in his car, on the ground that he had not made a knowing
~

and intelligent waiver of his rights to counsel and to remain
silent.

The trial court (Moriarty, J.) agreed that the statements
<----------,

were inadmissible.

He reasoned that resp

~

----

affirmativel~had

attempted to obtain counsel; that the trooper did not view resp's
initial statement (about the single marijuana cigarette) as a
waiver of rights, because he told resp not to say anymore when
resp volunte red to identify the "biggies''; and that resp was
obviously u der the influence of al·cohol at the time, which was
indicated by the breathalyzer test, by resp's strange behavior as
testified to by the police officers.

The court noted that the

SJC has made it clear that when a suspect has been brought in on
a charge of drunkenness, the police should not proceed with
questioning on the basis of a waiver of Miranda rights until the
suspect is "clearly capable of responding intelligently.

l

The court held, however, that the evidence seized in

resp's car was admissible.

Finding little guidance in precedent,

as Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, and its progeny deal
with the converse situation of a statement being given in

- 4 -
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response to an unlawful search, the court concluded that
"the prophylactic approach of Miranda

. should [not] be

extended to exclude evidence obtained as an indirect result of
a suspect's in-custody statement, where there has been no purposeful
attempt to subvert the defendant's rights."

Petn 17a.

The

court found support in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, where
this Court upheld the admissibility of testimony of a witness who
had been discovered as a result of a defendant's statement which
had been given without advising him of his right to appointed
counsel if he was indigent.

The Court observed in Michigan v.

Tucker:
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged
in willful, or at the very least negligent conduct
which has deprived the defendant of his rights.
Where the officer's conduct was pursued in complete
good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses
much of its force."
417 U.S., at 447.

The court here found that the police "were

scrupulous in their efforts to obey the mandate of Miranda."
elaborated as follows:

I

"The defendant's rights were read to him on no less
than t~ons, and the officers made no
attempt whatever to interrogate him with regard to
the crime for which he w~s initially arrested.
The only interrogation of the defendant consisted
of
S1fig ie qtre s t 10n which was put to him after
the mar1JUana c1garette was discovered in his
shirt pocket, and after he had been read the
warnings for the third time. Furthermore, that
question was in respons~n UQSOlicit~~ stat~ment
b~t to the effect that he d1d not
regard possession of the single cigarette as a
crime • . . . I am satisfied that Trooper Taliaferro
asked the single question as a natural consequence
of the immediately preceding events, and without
any conscious intent to deny the defendant his

a

It

-

(
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right to silence or his right to the assistance of
counsel."
Petn 19a.

The court's ultimate conclusion was that the . evidence

seized in the search should not be suppressed under the circumstances,
because it would not further the deterrent purposes of the
exclusionary rule when there was "no police misconduct".
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed resp's conviction and

• :;;;;:;:::::-

ordered a new trial without the evidence.

/

In doing so, it followed

its earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Haas, Mass. Adv. Sh.
2212 (1977), where it was held that evidence obtained in violation

'

of Miranda may not be used to establish probable cause for an arrest.
The court seems to have thought its decision was somewhat inconsistent with Michigan v. Tucker because it cited it as a "but cf.".
Petn 7a.

The court reasoned that the policy underlying suppression

of fruits of an unlawful search is less compelling than fruits of
a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because statements
are less likely to be reliable than evidence obtained in even an
unlawful search.

The court therefore held that the evidence would

have to be suppressed at resp's retrial.
The court made two other points that are worth mentioning.
First, it affirmed the trial court's ruling that the existence
of probable cause in support of the search warrant "unquestionably
depended upon the statement of the defendant, quoted in the
affidavit • .

II

Second, it concluded that the search could

not be validated as a warrantless search.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The State contends that this is a novel

question that has not been decided by this Court, although dictum

7

....

(

6 -

in Michigan v. Tucker suggests that the court below was wrong.
It contends that the decision represents an "unwarranted expansi
of Miranda.

The State notes that statements taken in violation

of Miranda can be used for impeachment purposes, Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, and evidence illegally seized by
state authorities may be used in federal civil proceedings,
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433.

It also

inadmissible at trial may be used to establish probable cause
for a search warrant (e.g., hearsay).

"The Commonwealth suggests

that, in the instant case, the interest of the public in having
a defendant's guilt or innocence determined on the basis of
trustworthy evidence outweighs the need to deter improper police
misconduct." . Petn 9.

Finally, the State says that although this

Court said in Michigan v. Tucker that the "fruits of the
poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun could be applied to Fifth
as well as Fourth Amendment violations, a proper case for such
application would have to be one in which the police acted in bad
faith, given the deterrence policies underlying the exclusionary
rule.
Resp replies, first, that this is not a final judgment
because resp has yet to be retried.

On the

mer~ts,

resp distinguishes

Tucker on the ground that that decision involved police activity
before Miranda, and this was a significant factor in the Court's
decision.

In addition, the Tucker Court emphasized that all that

had happened in Tucker was that the procedural safeguards of the
constitutional right had not been provided; the defendant's

-
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constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination itself
had not been violated.

417 U.S., at 444.

Here, on the contrary

the Miranda warnings were given but the police asked resp a
question in the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver.
And this was after resp affirmatively demonstrated a desire for
counsel.
Resp submits that "if the police are allowed to use illegally
obtained confessions and admissions for clues . •

.

, then the

warning requirements of Miranda would be meaningless, for the
police would be permitted to accomplish indirectly what they
could not achieve directly."

Response 7.

Finally, resp notes

that the decision below is consistent with a Maryland intermediate
appellate decision in which fruits of a confession, obtained not
because of an inadvertent failure to give the Miranda warnings
but in the absence of a valid waiver, were suppressed.

In re

Appeal No. 245 (75), 349 A.2d 434 (Md. App. 1975).
4.

DISCUSSION:

It seems to me the decision is final under

the third category of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 481.

This involves cases where, "if the party seeking interim

review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal issue will be
,-

mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the governing
state law would not permit him again to present his federal claims
for review."

Here, if resp is convicted upon retrial, the issue

presented here will be moot; if he is acquitted, most likely the
State would not be able to appeal.

(Cox Broadcasting cited

California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436, as an example of the third
- category.

There the Court noted that if the defendant in that case

- 8 -

were acquitted, an appeal by the State would be disallowed by
I do not know what the Massachusetts law is. on this

state law.
point.

The Court might want to check into this point if it is

considering a grant.)

·-

On the merits, no case clearly governs this one.

Michigan v.

Tucker is the closest, but resp is correct that the Court
emphasized in that case that the defect consisted only in not
giving all the warnings later held to be required in Miranda.
The Court held that there had not been a violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights, and therefore that Wong Sun
\ did not apply.

~
(,_., ,

The same cannot be said in this case.
1/

~'

This case therefore presents an open question.

On the one

hand, the police conduct here was found to be in good faith.
Petr says the deterrent purpose of the exclusinary rule would
not be served by excluding the evidence in this case.

On the

other hand, the trooper questioned resp when he had not given a
valid waiver of rights, and so there was a violation of his
co~stitut i ona l rig hts, which the Court said was absent in Tucker .
.;

Except for the one state case cited by resp, the parties
do not cite lower court decisions on this question.
resolution therefore could be deferred.

Its

This case does present

a clean set of facts for considering the issue, however, and the
opinions below -- and the parties' briefs -- are clear.
There is a response.
5/12/78
sl
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May 2.3, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONFERENCE
Subject:

No. 77-1388, Massachusetts v. Charles F. White

This case has been relisted for the May 25 Conference,
List 3, Sheet 2.
The legal officers were asked to determine if there
was any reason why this case should not be granted to consider whether the Mass. SJC correctly held that physical
evidence derived from a search warrant, whose sufficiency
depends on a statement of res~ should be suppressed because
the statement had been made in the absence of an intelligent
and voluntary waiver of resp's Miranda rights.
Summary: There do not appear to be any jurisdictional
or other . problems in this case.
Discussion: 1. Jurisdiction. Although the Mass SJC reversed
resp 's
a conviction and remanded for a new trial, the
decision appears to satisfy the finality requirement of 28
U.S.C. 1257 (3). Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 481 (1975)
(" [T] he federal claim has been finally
decided, · with further proceedings on the merits in the
state courts to come, but • . . later review of the federal
issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the
case "~ If resp is convicted upon retrial without the
suppressed evidence, which seems unlikely, the suppression
question will be moot; if resp is acquitted, the state will
be precluded from appealing. ~/
Regarding the latter consideration,under state law the
only appeal of right the prosecution has is from decisions
dismissing an indictment or complaint. See Mass. Gen. Laws.
Ann., ch. 278, §28E (West).
In addition, it may seek leave
from a justice or the chief justice of the SJC for leave to
take an interlocutory appeal from the suppression of evidence.
Ibid. Thus, although the Double Jeopardy Clause might allow
a state to appeal from an acquittal seeking reinstatement of a prior

-~

*/In Cohen v. New York, 385 U.S. 976 (1966), relied
upon by resp (Br. in Op. 4), the Court denied cert "for want
of a final judgment," but there the petn was filed by the
defendant following the state's successful interlocutory
appeal from the suppression of evidence, and the considerations
governing finality are different .

.

•.

"'

....

,

- 2 conviction on the ground that it had been reversed erroneously, a prosecutor in Mass. would lack statutory authority
to take such an appeal.
2.
The Merits. There do not appear to be any
other problems in this case. That the SJC decided the
question on the basis of federal constitutional law is
apparent from the citation of its own decision in Commonwealth
v. Haas, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1977) 2212, 2225, which relied on
cases-from CA 5, CA 7, and several other state appellate
courts.
Conclusion:
in this case.

There do not appear to be any problems

Marc Richman
Legal Officer

~~~_.

__

....__

'-/-~~~
/1/vL ~~
Le.,d~l-o~
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM

Mark Richman concludes that there are no bugs in this
~'

a~ I

agree.

But I thought I'd offer a brief description

of the constraints that

8H

would face the Court in considering

this case and a brief discussion of the merits.
There are two factual findings below that would place
constraints on this Court's scqpe _2f review in considering
"-""
......
._.
this case. ~ the courts below concluded that ~exx resp
-~

had not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
compulsory
privilege against/self-incrimination and his right to counsel.
I noticed that you questioned this conclusion at
points in the preliminary memo.

seve~

Did you mean by these question

marks that you thought resp did waive his rights when he

2.

made the comments summarized on p. 2 of the memo?

If so,

I would just point out that xke in considering the merits
of the case, the Court will be bound by the conclusions
below that there was not a valid waiver of rights.
The

~m below

is

t~

the police officers

acted in good faith, and that the constitutional violation
was inadvertent.

This conclusion also is questionable, as

one might argue that the trooper's question to resp about
whether he had more marijuana in his possession was deliberate.

-- -

--

Indeed, although the trial court clearly found that the

-

trooper acted in good faith and that "he asked the single
....,..,.....,....,_.
question as a natural consequence of the immediately
~

/

preceding events, and without any conscious intent to deny
the defendant his [constitutional rights]", see memo at 4-5,
the trial court also concluded that the trooper did not
regard resp's initial statement about the single marijuana
cigarette as a waiver of rights.

See memo at 3.

Some

Justices might have trouble with the characterization of
the trooper's actions as inadvertent, because of this seeming
inconsistency in the trial court's findings.
If you think these factual predicates will get in the
way of the Court's consideration of the legal issue, then
you might want to withdraw your vote to grant.

On the other

hand, this case strikes me as cleaner and more clear than
most, so it's probably a good vehicle for considering the issue,

'

as long as the findings below (of invalid waiver and inadvertence
of the constitutional violation) are accepted.

3.
On the merits, I think the question will be a close
one; and the fact that there are only 4 votes to grant
suggests that the balance may tip in favor of affirmance.
As discussed in the memo, there are good arguments on
both sides.

------"'

In resp's favor . is the point that the xais

rationale of Wong Sun is fully applicable here:

the police

will know that even if they cannot use an unconstitutionally
obtained statement at the trial, they may be able to
discover admissible evidence by questioning the defendant.
The state's response to that is that this rationale does not
apply when the police action is inadvertent.

This argument

is a good one, as a matter of theory, but here is where
the lower courts' findings of good faith will be troublesome
to some Justices.

The trooper's question to resp certainly

was deliberate, in the sense that the trooper meant to ask

-

it. · I suppose what the lower courts meant was that it just
s lipped out; he wasn't fishing for a clue in order to get
evidence against resp.

The state's next argument is that

the evidence obtained is highly probabive, and the exclusionary
rule is strong medicine, especially under these circumstances
of probative evidence and axg police anduct not found to be
in bad faith.
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June 15, 1978 Conference
List 3 , Sheet 2
Motion for Leave to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis

No . 77-1388
MASSACHUSETTS

v.
WHITE
Cert to Mass. Supreme Judicial Court was granted May 30 .
Respondent has filed the necessary affidavit and seeks leave to
proceed ifp .

)---

The underlying issue is whether statements held inadmissible
at trial (because defendant did not knowingly and intelligently
waive his Miranda rights ) can be used to establish probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant .
It appears appropriate to allow respondent to proceed ifp.
6/13/78
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The primary issue in this case is whether physical
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=w

e~ idence that is the "fruit" of a statement obtained by the

at

~

~

a defendant's criminal trial.

--/ '-*-

The case is complicated by a
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2.
difficult factual question:

whether reap's statement was taken

under conditions rendering it not only inadmissible under
Miranda, but also involuntary in the traditional Fifth Amendment
sense.
The briefs in this case are mediocre at best, but the
issue is straightforward, the facts are not complicated, and each
party's arguments are made relatively clear from their papers.
This memo will therefore be restricted to describing the one
factual----------~--------------------------------------point that I perceive to be of greatest importance and to
setting out the analysis I believe to be correct.
The controlling legal question, which I believe is not
really open for discussion any longer, is whether Miranda

~----

warnings are constitutional requirements rather than judiciallycreated procedures to effectuate the policies of the Fifth
Amendment.
v.

~York,

Michigan v. Tucker, 417
401

u.s.

latter conclusion.

u.s.

433 (1974), and Harris

222 (1971), in my opinion, compel the

Assuming there has been no more than a

Miranda, as opposed to a Fifth Amendment, violation in this case,
the question therefore becomes whether the exclusionary rule
should be applied through the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine to physical evidence located because of statements
obtained contrary to Miranda.

The answer depends on whether the

benefits, if any, are outweighed by the obvious costs of such a
rule.

If a Fifth Amendment violation has occurred, however, the

question is whether the "fruit" doctrine must be applied to
exclude evidence discovered as a result of statements obtained
involuntarily in the traditional, or constitutional, sense.

3.

II. THE FACTUAL PROBLEM

It is unclear from the opinion of the two state courts
below whether resp was found to have been so intoxicated that any
statements made in response to police questioning were
necessarily compelled in the Fifth Amendment sense.

The officers

testified that he was "bouncing off the walls," etc., and from

----

the portion of the record quoted in resp's brief at 23-24, it
appears that the police finally decided to put resp in a jail
cell after it appeared that he was unable to use the telephone
successfully.

The trial court thus would have been justified in

concluding that any statements made by resp in response to police
questioning were not "the product of a rational intellect and a
free will."

Mincey v. Arizona, 98 s.ct. 2408 (1978), quoting

previous decisions.

The question, however, is whether such a

conclusion was actually made.
The relevant portion of the trial court's opinion is at
pp. 14a-15a bf the petition for cert; the Supreme Judicial

-

Court's pertinent remarks are at pp. 6a-7a.
look at these carefully.

I recommend that you

My reading is that, while the trial

court was not focusing on the difference between a mere failure
to waive Miranda rights and the giving of an involuntary
statement in response to police questioning, it believed that
only the former occurred.

Significantly, the court initially

focuses on resp's attempt to retain an attorney and the police
officer's apparent belief that resp had not waived his rights.

4.
These factors suggest both that the

cou~t

believed resp was

capable of rational choice and that the police error consisted
asking a question before obtaining a clear waiver of rights.
Res?'S intoxication is mentioned as a third factor.

But

the court does not specify whether this, when added to the other
circumstances, somehow reinforced the conclusion that resp had
voluntarily decided not to waive his rights, or whether the
intoxication made resp incapable of waiving his rights and,
presumably, also of making voluntary statements in response to
police questioning.
The Supreme Judicial Court's opinion does not clarify
this point.

That court seems to have believed that the attempt

to call an attorney and the officer's apparent belief that res?
had not wiaved his rights were sufficient in themselves to show
the absence of waiver.

This would assume that resp was

sufficiently rational to decline to waive his rights.

The SJC

then refers to the intoxication, saying that it would have been
"the more prudent and constitutionally preferable course for the
police to withhold any further questioning 'until [the defendant]
was clearly capable of responding intelligently.'"

It is simply

impossible to be positive that the SJC, by this statement, is not
saying that resp was incapable of making voluntary responses to
the officer's questions.

But taken in context, I think the

better reading is that the the court believed resp was capable of

-<-----~--------------~--.---~----------------------------------------------~

voluntary action, that he had asserted his Miranda right to

-

__.--.w

o btain counsel (which was not yet a Sixth Amendment right since
formal criminal charges had not been brought), and that further

.'

.

'.
!.:·

~

5.
questioning was impermissible for that reason alone.

Under this

reading of the lower courts' findings of fact, resp's
intoxication, while not strictly relevant to whether a waiver of
rights had occured, was seen as no more than a prudential factor
that should have suggested to the police that they not attempt
further questioning at that time.

III. EXCLUSION IF MIRANDA ALONE WAS VIOLATED?

If I am correct that the courts below found that resp's
statement was voluntary but obtained in violation of

~iranda,

the

question is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied
through the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.

Under

recent case law, I think it is quite clear that it should not.

l~

Michigan v. Tucker, supra, and Harris v. New ·York,
supra, are cases in which the Court allowed the use of statements
obtained against a defendant in violation of Miranda.

In Tucker,

a statement by the defendant led the police to a witness who
testified adversely to him.

In Harris, statements taken in

---·--

violation of Miranda were used to impeach the defendant, who
chose to testify at trial.

In each case the Court made it clear

that the statements were not involuntary in the traditional
sense, but only that all the procedural requirements of Miranda

,

had not been complied with.

The necessary implication of these

holdings is that the Miranda warnings are not constitutionally
mandated rules, but are "constitutional common law" created by
this Court in order to effectuate the purposes of the Fifth

·~~

~~.:-~
-·,~

~~

~.

~
~
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6.
Amendment.

Thus, Miranda warnings are on a par with the Fourth

Amendment exclusionary rule which, as Stone v. Powell makes
clear, is not a personal constitutional right of the accused.
The Court said as much in Tucker:

"the police conduct at issue

here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege
against compulsory incrimination, but departed only from the
prophylactic standards laid down by this Court in Miranda to
safeguard that privilege."

417 U.S. at 445-446.

Tucker is not necessarily controlling here, because the
"fruit" involved in that case was a live witness rather than, as
here, physical evidence.

But the Court has recently said that

"live-witness testimony is not always or even usually more
reliable or dependable than inanimate evidence. Indeed, just the
\._..I

opposite may be true."
1054, 1061

(1978).

united · states v. Ceccolini, 98 S.Ct.

The burden therefore should be on resp to

show why the nature of the "fruit" qathered as a result of the
inadmissible statement should make a difference in the outcome of
the case.
I believe the critical arguments cut against resp.

The

primary purposes of the Miranda are to deter police misconduct
and to provide clear guidelines to which the police can conform
their conduct.

Neither of these policies would be sacrificed by

refusing to apply the "fruit" doctrine when a statement is found
to be voluntary, even in the absence of compliance with Miranda.
The Miranda warninqs become no less clearly defined; their
content remains unchanged, and the police are still expected to
deliever them in every case.

7.

More important, the desired deterrent effect of Miranda
is not likely to be seriously diluted."

Resp and the Mass. SJC

claim that refusing to apply the "fruit" doctine in this case
would create an incentive to police to ask questions in violation
of Miranda in hopes of locating damaging evidence against the
accused.

I find it difficult to believe that an officer would

deliberately risk the admissibility of a confession itself by
ignoring Miranda in hopes of locating evidence favorable to the
prosecution.

As the Court said in Harris, "[a]ssuming that the

exclusionary rule [that applies when Miranda is violated] has a
deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient
deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made
unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief."

401 U.S.

at 225.
On the other hand the societal costs of excluding
relevant evidence whose probative value is unimpeached is
obviously great, as you pointed out in Stone v. Powell.

Thus,

even if some marginal incentive to disregard Miranda were
created, it would be justified by the countervailing social
interests.
It may be worth noting that as a matter of analysis it
may be easier to restrict the exclusionary rule in this case than
it was

in~tone

v. Powell.

There it was assumed that a

constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment had occured.
The question was whether to apply a particular judicial remedy
for that violation.

Ip this £?Se, by contrast, the violation is

not of the Constitution, but merely of judicial rules intended to

8.
implement constitutional policy.

Thus, , the holding recommended

in this case would seem to be justifiable a fortiori in light of

stone v. Powell.

IV. EXCLUSION IF THE CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED?

Resp argues that the statement that led the police to
the physical evidence was obtained not only in violation of his

Miranda rights, but also unconstitutionally because it was
involuntary.

If the Court should be persuaded that this is

correct, then the analysis would be different.

The question

--------------------------------

would then be whether the Court wished to apply the "fruit"
doctrine to statements that have been obtained because of police
coercion.

Although it still could be argued that excluding such

evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief would provide
sufficient deterrence, the Court would probably (and properly) be
much more hesitant to take this step.

For one thing, it is less

evident that the "fruit" doctrine is merely a judicial
~----------------------------------------------

prophylactic rather than constitutional requirement.

Even if the

former is true, other considerations weigh in favor of the
"fruit" doctrine in this situation.

The constitutional policies

against compelling a defendant to participate in his own
conviction come into full play when a statement is truly
involuntary, and the reliablility of involuntary statements
becomes a major problem.
With respect to the reliability problem, it could be
argued that when the evidence is taken before a magistrate, as

9.
was done here, that judicial officer's

independen~

evaluation of

the facts offered to show probable cause is an adequate safequard
against unreliability, i.e., the issue becomes a Fourth rather
than a Fifth Amendment problem.
difficulties, however.

That argument has obvious

Is the magistrate to refuse to rely on

all statements that he perceives to have been obtained
involuntarily, or may he consider those that, in spite of any
Fifth Amendment problems, are sufficiently reliable?

And what

happens when, as here, the affidavit of the police officer does
not disclose the facts suggesting involuntariness?
If resp's statement is deemed to have been involuntarily
taken from him, then the Court would be taking a dramatic step in
refusing to apply the "fruit" doctrine, one that I would not
recommend and with which I suspect you would disagree.

If the

Court is in doubt about the voluntariness issue, I recommend that

~--------~------------------------------dismissal
or a remand be considered. The Court could either

---------

D.I.G. the case, stating that the ambiguity on voluntariness in
the opinions of the lower courts makes this case unsuitable for

review, or it could remand for further findings of fact on the
voluntariness issue.

If the latter course were adopted, the

Court might go ahead and address the merits to inform the lower
courts of the nature and significance of the findings that need
to be made and to set a useful precedent.

·.

1 0.

V. OTHER ISSUES

Resp claims that the decision below is not final since
the Mass. SJC ordered a remand.

I agree with petr that this case

falls within one of the Cox exceptions to absolute finality since
the state, for all practical purposes, has lost its case if the
judgment of the SJC is not reversed.
Resp also argues that the decision below may have rested
on adequate and independent state grounds and that this Court
should at least remand for clarification on this point.
argument is unpersuasive.

This

The SJC's opinion makes no reference

to state law other than previous decisions of the state courts.
And the state cases the SJC found most important appear to have
relied on federal law.

See Reply Brief of Petr at 3-7.

11.

VI. SUMMARY

I would conclude that Tucker and Harris show that a
Miranda violation is not a consitutional violation if a
defendant's statement is voluntarily given.

I would read the

lower courts asn aving found that resp's statement was
voluntarily made, but nevertheless obtained in violation of
Miranda because he had not waived the rights granted to him by
that decision.

I would then hold, consistent with

Tuc~er,

that

the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine will not be extended
to apply the exclusionary rule to phsyical evidence obtained as a
result of Miranda violations.

Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court must be reversed.
If the Court believes that the lower courts found resp's
statement to have been involuntarily given in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, I would affirm.
If the Court is unsure what the lower courts held on the
voluntariness issue, I would either D.I.G. or remand.

•'
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